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ARTICLES
APPLICATION OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
PRINCIPLES TO SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMS
UNDER THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND
CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT (RICO)
Barbara Black*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)1 was enacted in 1970 as part of an overall congressional
effort to combat organized crime.' The statutory language, however,
lends itself to applications beyond the Act's primary purpose and can
encompass ordinary commercial and business fraud claims. Plaintiffs
alleging securities fraud violations under section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act")* and its rule 10b-54
now routinely add claims alleging RICO violations. Because a plain-
tiff who establishes injury resulting from a RICO violation can re-
cover treble damages, the settlement value of his claims is signifi-
cantly enhanced.' As this aspect of RICO has become more widely
© 1984 by Barbara Black.
* B.A. 1970, Barnard College; J.D. 1973, Columbia University. The author gratefully
acknowledges the research assistance of Teri L. Shulman and Laura D. Barbieri, class of 1986
and 1984, respectively, Pace University School of Law.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982), amended by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1020, 98 Stat. 2143.
2. RICO was enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
5. In recent years there has been "an explosion of civil RICO litigation," Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 486 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 53 U.S.L.W. 5034 (1985).
While there were only a few cases including civil RICO claims in the first 10 years of the
statute's existence, there are now over 100 published decisions. Id. Apparently, few cases have
gone to trial; almost all of the reported decisions involve issues raised in the pre-trial stages.
There is, however, at least one decision awarding judgment for the plaintiff, Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co. v. Plaza Oldsmobile Ltd., No. 83-2213 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 1984), 191 N.Y.L.J.
June 22, 1984, at 1, col. 2. But see id. (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1985) (avail. on Westlaw) (court
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known, securities firms and their attorneys, among others, have
mounted efforts to amend the statute in order to restrict its
application.
An issue that has received little discussion in cases or commen-
taries is whether a plaintiff can use common law principles of vicari-
ous liability to increase the number of possible defendants in a
RICO suit. Actions alleging the "garden variety" securities frauds of
churning and suitability are illustrative. A defrauded customer may,
dismisses RICO claims as to another defendant because there was no distinct RICO injury);
see also note 26 infra.
6. The Vice Presidential Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services has recom-
mended that RICO be amended to make it inapplicable to securities firms, insurance compa-
nies, banks and other legitimate businesses. Bush Task Group Endorses Amendments to RICO
and ICA to Reduce Litigation, 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 20, at 865 (May 18,
1984). Seventy-four percent of the attorneys responding to an American Bar Association ques-
tionnaire said that RICO should be amended, and the most commonly suggested change would
limit the treble damages award to victims of traditional organized and white collar crime.
RICO Task Force Reports at ABA Section Meeting, Results of Survey Presented, 16 SEc.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 15, at 638 (April 13, 1984). The Interest Rate Regulation Sub-
committee of the Committee on Consumer Financial Service has established a group to propose
amendments to limit RICO's use in commercial litigation. RICO's Reported Demise, Tender
Offers, ULOE Adoption Considered at Bar Meeting, 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 33,
at 1393 (Aug. 17, 1984). The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has formed a
RICO policy task force to consider amendment limiting accountants' civil liability. 17 SEc.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 2, at 57 (Jan. 11, 1985).
7. "Churning" is defined as:
any act of any broker . . . or dealer designed to effect with or for any cus-
tomer's account in respect to which such broker . . . or dealer or his agent or
employee is vested with any discretionary power any transactions of purchase or
sale which are excessive in size or frequency in view of the financial resources
and character of such account.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7(a) (1984).
The SEC takes the position that churning can take place not only in accounts where the
broker-dealer technically has discretionary power but also "whenever the broker or dealer is in
a position to determine the volume and frequency of transactions by reason of the customer's
willingness to follow the suggestions of the broker or dealer and he abuses the customer's
confidence by overtrading." Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 21 S.E.C. 865, 890 (1946), af'd
Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.D.C. 1949). The defrauded customer has
a private cause of action under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5, e.g., Hecht v.
Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
The National Association of Securities Dealers Rules of Fair Practice state that a broker-
dealer, in making recommendations to a customer, must have "reasonable grounds for believ-
ing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any,
disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation
and needs." Nat'l Ass'n. of Sec. Dealers, NASD Manual Art. III, § 2, 12152 (1979). The
New York Stock Exchange's "Know Thy Customer Rule" requires a .broker to "use due dili-
gence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer." NYSE Rule 405 (CCH) New
York Stock Exchange Manual 1 2405. It is unclear whether a customer has a private cause of
action under the suitability rules, but suitability is usually an aspect of a churning case. R.
JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 571 (5th ed. 1982).
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under many courts' interpretation of the statute, state a RICO claim
against the registered representative who engages in such illegal
practices,8 but he will want to join as a defendant the securities firm
employing the registered representative. It is uncertain, however,
whether the employer can be held liable under RICO without a
showing that it participated in its employee's frauds. Other examples
are provided by RICO suits against employers based upon employ-
ees' insider trading violations9 or violations of the tender offer laws.10
Part I of this article outlines RICO's statutory scheme, reviews
the common law doctrines under which a principal may be liable for
the acts of its agent and the policies behind these doctrines, and ex-
amines RICO decisions raising the issue of vicarious liability. Part II
examines non-RICO federal cases and identifies relevant factors de-
termining the appropriateness of applying respondeat superior and
agency principles to federal statutes. Finally, Part III analyzes the
specific provisions of RICO in light of the factors identified in Part
II. The article concludes that these factors do not support the impo-
sition of liability on defendants other than the primary RICO viola-
tor. Accordingly, RICO should not be extended to reach defendants
liable only by reason of principles of vicarious liability. If courts re-
fuse to extend such liability, there will be a significant reduction in
the number of RICO suits brought against securities firms. As a re-
sult, the concern over the firms' potential extended liability under
RICO can be alleviated without congressional amendment.'
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Statutory Scheme
RICO makes it illegal to engage in a pattern of racketeering
activity to achieve certain enumerated results. A "pattern of racke-
teering activity" consists of at least two acts of racketeering activity
within a ten-year period.' 2 The key term, "racketeering activity," is
8. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
9. E.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y.), affd on other
grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984).
10. E.g., In re Action Industries Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Va. 1983);
Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., 574 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ohio 1982);
Spencer Companies, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 98,361 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981).
11. There are reports that Congress will consider amending RICO to limit its civil lia-
bility provisions. 17 SEC. REC. & L. REP (BNA) No. 2, at 49 (Jan. 11, 1985). Senate Judici-
ary Committee Chairman Strom Thurmond has promised to hold hearings early in 1985. Id.
at 57. See also supra note 6.
12. One of the acts of racketeering activity must have occurred after the effective date of
1984]
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defined in terms of a number of state and federal offenses.'3 Plain-
tiffs in securities fraud cases rely on three of these: "any offense in-
volving fraud in the sale of securities, punishable under any law of
the United States" (section 1961(1)(D));" any act indictable under
the mail fraud statute (section 1961(1)(B));"5 and any act indictable
under the wire fraud statute (also section 1961(1)(B)). 6
The inclusion of the offense of "fraud in the sale of securities"
is curious. Unlike most of the enumerated federal offenses in section
1961(1), this offense refers to no specific provision in the United
States Code. Section 1961(1)(D) was a late addition to the bill.1 7
The only references to securities transactions during the Congres-
sional hearings were to sales of forged and stolen securities by indi-
viduals associated with organized crime." Some commentators have
argued that Congress did not intend to incorporate the federal secur-
ities law into RICO.' Courts, however, have not adopted this inter-
pretation.2" The phrase "fraud in the sale of securities" is generally
assumed to mean those securities violations which require a specific
showing of fraud or scienter, the most common being violations of
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and its Rule 10b-5.2" Additional
confusion is created by the fact that, unlike section 10(b) and Rule
the statute and the last act must have occurred within 10 years (excluding any period of im-
prisonment) after the commission of a prior act. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982), amended by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1020, 98 Stat. 2143.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1982).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1982).
16. Id.
17. Bridges, Private RICO Litigation Based Upon "Fraud in the Sale of Securities,"
18 GA. L. REV. 43, 58-59 (1983).
18. Id. at 59, n.103.
19. Id. at 63; see generally Note, RICO and Securities Fraud: A Workable Limitation,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1513, 1534-43 (1983).
20. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
21. Macintosh, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: Powerful New
Tool of the Defrauded Securities Plaintiff, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 7, 30 (1982); Long, Treble
Damages for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws: A Suggested Analysis and Applica-
tion of the RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L. REV. 201, 226 (1981). Other possible
securities violations includable under § 1961(l)(D) are the other antifraud provisions of the
Exchange Act, §§ 15(c) and 14(e), and of the Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), as well as other
substantive provisions which may encompass fraud, such as § 5 of the Securities Act and §§ 9
and 13(d) of the Exchange Act. One commentator concludes that "any violation of the federal
securities laws other than the reporting or so-called housekeeping measures should suffice." Id.
In Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280
(1984), the court held that § 1961(1)(D) excludes securities violations under Rule 10b-5 based
on trading on inside information where the RICO plaintiff is a shareholder and the defendant
is an outsider since, under Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), defendant's con-
duct is not fraudulent as to the plaintiff.
r .....
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10b-5, which prohibit fraud in connection with the purchase and
sale of securities, section 1961(1)(D) only includes fraudulent sales.
The few cases that have considered this inconsistency have concluded
that the provision should be read to include fraudulent purchases as
well."
Commission of two acts of racketeering activity, or two predi-
cate offenses within the requisite time period does not, by itself, es-
tablish a RICO violation. The illegal acts must have been committed
for a specific improper purpose. There are three such prohibited
purposes set forth in section 1962.23 RICO securities fraud plaintiffs
invariably use section 1962(c), which makes it illegal "for any per-
son employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in . . .
interstate . . . commerce, to conduct or participate . . . in the con-
duct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity . . . -2" Thus, the primary RICO violator is an employee
or an associate of another individual or entity; the statute is silent as
to the enterprise's liability.
Finally, section 1964(c) establishes the civil remedy, providing
that any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 may recover treble damages and attorney's
fees.2 " This is the reason plaintiffs strive to assert a RICO claim
instead of being content with a securities fraud claim.
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Sedima, the cases were
split on whether to give special emphasis to the phrase "by reason
of' a section 1962 violation. Some courts interpreted this language to
mean that the plaintiff must suffer a special RICO injury to have
standing.2 Under this view, a RICO claim brought by a plaintiff
22. The cases can find no basis for including sales and excluding purchases; moreover
any fraudulent purchase involves a sale induced by fraud. Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen En-
ergy Resources Ltd., 574 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Spencer Companies, Inc. v.
Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,361 (D.
Mass, Nov. 17, 1981).
23. In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982) prohibits conspiring to violate subsections
(a), (b) or (c) of § 1962.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982). Subsections (a) and (b) of § 1962 reflect congressional
concern about the infiltration of legitimate enterprises by organized crime elements. See infra
note 173 and accompanying text. Subsection (a) prohibits the investment of income derived
from a pattern of racketeering activity into the acquisition or operation of any enterprise en-
gaged in interstate commerce; subsection (b) prohibits the acquisition or maintenance of any
interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in interstate commerce, through a
pattern of racketeering activity.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 19 64(c) (1982).
26. In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 53 U.S.L.W
5034 (1985), the Second Circuit held that the "by reason of" language requires that plaintiff
allege injury caused by an activity which RICO was designed to deter, which is different from
19841
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alleging securities fraud violations as the predicate offenses is inevi-
tably dismissed, because the only alleged injuries flow directly from
those violations. 27 Other courts, while recognizing that the RICO in-
jury and the securities fraud injury are the same and that RICO
thus serves only to increase the recovery threefold, nevertheless con-
clude that treble recovery is the plain intent of the statute.28
B. A Principal's Liability for an Agent's Acts
A principal may be liable for an agent's torts under fault or no-
that caused simply by the predicate acts. Id. at 494. In addition, the Second Circuit held that
prior convictions for the predicate offenses are required to maintain a civil action. See infra
note 53. In Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), the Second Circuit
reiterated the requirement of a "distinct RICO injury" and provided examples where, in its
view, the injury could be attributable to a pattern of racketeering activity and not just to the
individual predicate acts. Id. at 512. This is the only opinion even hypothetically illustrating a
distinct RICO injury. Judge Cardamone vigorously dissented in both these opinions. Subse-
quently, the Second Circuit in Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984), while com-
pelled to follow Sedima and Bankers Trust, reaffirmed Judge Cardamone's views. The Second
Circuit refused en banc consideration of the three cases, Furman at 525.
The Seventh Circuit, in Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chi-
cago, 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), a fd, 53 U.S.L.W. 5067 (1985), disagreed with the Sec-
ond Circuit and held that plaintiff need not allege an injury beyond any injury to business or
property resulting from the underlying acts of racketeering.
In Sedima, the Supreme Court rejected in a 5-4 decision, the Second Circuit's require-
ment of a racketeering injury as without support in the language and legislative history of the
Act, 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 53 U.S.L.W. 5034 (1985). It also rejected the Second
Circuit's prior conviction requirement. In a per curiam opinion, Harco, Inc. v. American Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), affd, 53 U.S.L.W. 5067 (1985),
the Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit decision as consistent with its opinion in
Sedima.
Other courts have held that section 1964(c) requires that plaintiff establish a "competi-
tive" injury, reasoning by analogy from antitrust law, Harper v. New Japan Securities Inter-
national, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1982), North Barrington Development,
Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Ill. 1980); or a "racketeering enterprise" injury,
reasoning by analogy from subsections (a) and (b) of section 1962, Landmark Savings & Loan
v. Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206, 208-09 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
A third approach is found in Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1984 Transfer
Binder] FED. Svc. L. REP. (CCH) V 91,634 (N.D. Cal. 1984), where the court held that
plaintiffs must allege either that they suffered an "enterprise injury;" or where the injury
flows from the predicate acts, that the "enterprise" is organized solely for criminal purposes.
None of these judicial attempts to restrict the private action can survive the Supreme Court
decisions in Sedima and Harco.
27. See supra note 26.
28. Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, No. C-84-0615-WWS, slip op. at 17-18 (N.D. Cal. May 3,
1984), Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1581 (E.D. Mich. 1983), Mauriber v. Shear-
son/American Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), Seville Industrial
Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1146, 1156-58 (D.N.J. 1983),
Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F. Supp. 1347, 1351 (E.D. Pa. 1983), Windsor Associates, Inc. v.
Greenfield, 564 F. Supp. 273, 276-77 (D. Md. 1983).
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fault theories.29 A principal is liable if it is deemed a participant,
along with its agent, in a fraudulent scheme. This requires, at least
knowing participation in the fraud, and perhaps intentional partici-
pation."0 In addition, a principal may be liable for its agents' mis-
deeds if it has been negligent or reckless in their selection or supervi-
sion.31 These are "fault" theories of liability.
The no-fault theories of liability, on the other hand, eliminate
the plaintiff's need to establish that the principal engaged in blame-
worthy conduct, and thus provide the plaintiff with better access to a
"deep pocket." A principal may be liable to a third party injured by
its agent's tort, even though the principal has not violated any duty
owed to the third party and has not authorized the agent's conduct.3 2
The basis for a firm's "no-fault" liability would be the common law
agency doctrines of respondeat superior, apparent authority or a
principal's liability for its agent's misrepresentations.
1. Respondeat Superior"3
In general, an employer is liable for any tort, whether negligent
or intentional, committed by its employee, so long as his conduct was
within the scope of the employment. 3 ' Liability extends to frauds
committed at least partly to further the employer's business, but does
not encompass wrongs motivated by the employee's personal spite or
29. These theories may also be described as primary and secondary liability theories.
Individuals who violate direct duties owed to the plaintiff are primary wrongdoers, while those
persons whose liabilities arise only because another has violated the law are secondary wrong-
doers. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 600
(1972).
30. For decisions in the RICO area, see O'Brien v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. [1984
Transfer Binder] FED SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 91,509 (D. Ariz. 1984) ("knowing or intentional
participation"); Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 758-60 (N.D. Cal. 1983) ("actively
engaged in the pattern of racketeering"). Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347,
1361 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1280 (1984), imposed an additional requirement of an interest in the criminal venture. See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 212 (1957).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213(d) (1957).
32. Id. at § 216.
33. The origins of respondeat superior are disputed. Compare Holmes, Agency I, 4
HARV. L. REV. 345 (1891) (respondeat superior developed from Roman law) with Wigmore,
Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARV L. REV. 315 (1894) (respondeat superior
developed from Germanic law). It was firmly established as part of the common law by 1725.
T. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 28-29 (1916) (as to negligent acts). Liability for willful acts,
including fraud, developed in the second half of the nineteenth century. Id. at 84, 121.
34. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §§ 69-70 (4th ed. 1971), F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, JR., 'FORTS § 26.9 (1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 216, 219(1),
231 (1957).
1984]
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malice."5 When the tortious conduct may result in the award of pu-
nitive damages or criminal penalties, however, the employer's liabil-
ity may not be absolute. The Restatement Second of Agency states
that punitive damages may be awarded against an employer only if
there is some fault on its part or if the employee was employed in a
managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment.8"
This rule, however, does not apply to treble damages statutes, "as to
which no statement is made.""7 The Restatement says that an em-
ployer "may be subject" to penalties, 8 and the comments list the
language of the statute and its objectives as factors to consider. 9
2. Apparent Authority
When the employee's misconduct is outside the scope of employ-
ment, and the employer is not liable under respondeat superior, the
employer will still be liable if there was reliance upon the agent's
apparent authority, or if the employee was aided in accomplishing
the tort by the existence of the agency relation.40 Thus, the principal
may be liable even if the tort was committed solely to advance the
agent's personal illicit scheme."'
3. Misrepresentations
Finally, a principal is liable for its agent's misrepresentations
that cause pecuniary loss, if the statement was authorized, appar-
ently authorized, or within the power of the agent to make for the
principal.4 It does not matter that the agent is acting solely for his
own purposes.43
Although the common law doctrines imposing vicarious liability
are well established, their justification has been varied. 4 The pri-
35. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS, § 26.9 (1956). In Moss v.
Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1356 (S.D.N.Y.), aff d on other grounds, 719 F.2d
5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984), the court stated that an investment
banking firm could not be held derivatively liable for its employee's illegal insider trading
activity, because such conduct was outside the scope of his employment.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2170 (1957).
37. Id. at § 217C, comment c.
38. Id. at § 217D.
39. Id.
40. Id. at § 219(2)(d).
41. Id. at §§ 261, 262, 265; see American Society of Mechanical Engineers v.
Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982), discussed infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 249, 257 (1957).
43. Id. at § 262.
44. Baty stated that there were nine bases for justifying respondeat superior: control,
profit, revenge, carelessness, identification, evidence, indulgence, danger, satisfaction. T. BATY,
(Vol. 24
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mary modern rationale is risk distribution: the use of respondeat su-
perior to spread losses over a larger segment of the population has
been viewed as efficacious policy."5 This is sometimes referred to as
enterprise liability; injuries caused by the employer's employees are
simply costs of doing business that should be borne by the em-
ployer."' This rationale by itself may be sufficient justification. 7 In
addition, modern theory extends risk distribution beyond the enter-
prise, to the general public48 or at least to that part of general public
that pays for the enterprise's products or services.49 Another aspect
of risk distribution is that it is another protection the state offers its
workers, so their personal resources will not be exhausted because of
a work-related tort.50
The use of respondeat superior is also justified as a deterrent. It
encourages the employer to exercise greater care in hiring and super-
vising its employees, and thus is beneficial to society overall.51
C. The Cases
There are only a few cases that raise the issue of respondeat
superior or other agency theories of liability in civil RICO securities
fraud cases. 2 As discussed above, most concern the liability of a se-
curities firm for its employee's alleged churning and suitability viola-
tions." These cases find that the registered representative can be
VICARIOUS LIABILITY 147-48 (1916). He concluded that "the real reason for employers' lia-
bility is the ninth; the damages are taken from a deep pocket." Id. at 154.
45. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499, 499 (1961); Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 456-57 (1923);
Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 111-12 (1916); Seavey, Specula-
tions as to "Respondeat Superior," HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 433, 450 (1934).
46. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk I, 38 YALE L.J. 584, 593-
94 (1929).
47. Calabresi, supra note 45, at 514.
48. Id. at 527.
49. Id. at 518-19.
50. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 130 (1916).
51. Id. at 116; Seavey, supra note 45, at 447-48.
52. O'Brien v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP
(CCH) 91,509 (D. Ariz. 1984); Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 581 F. Supp. 88 (E.D. Pa.
1983); Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc.,
553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280
(1984); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Il1. 1982). See supra
note 7 and accompanying text.
53. There are other securities cases where the firm has been named as a defendant, but
the issue of respondeat superior has not been addressed. In many of them, the courts found
that no RICO claim has been stated, for a variety of reasons. The first four reasons cannot
survive after the Supreme Court opinion in Sedima and Harco. See supra note 26.
I). RICO requires a link to organized crime; Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache Securities,
1984]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24
sued under section 1962(c), but not the firm employing him.5 To
Inc., [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 91,573 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Aliberti v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 591 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mass. 1984); Hokama'v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566
F. Supp. 636 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCommodity Services, Inc., 558 F.
Supp. 1348 (S.D.N.Y.1983); Wagner v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 11982-83 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,032 (N.D. I11. 1982); Divco Constr. & Realty Corp. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 712 (S.D. Fla. 1983). An extensive list of
cases on both sides is found In re Catarella and E.F. Hutton & Co., 583 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D.
Pa. 1984).
2). The purposes and intent of RICO were not directed toward the activities alleged
against these defendants, Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210 (D. Cal. 1983).
3). Plaintiff lacks standing because no allegation of an injury "by reason of" a § 1962
violation, Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 592 F. Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Harper v. New
Japan Securities International, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D. Cal. 1982); see supra note 26
and accompanying text.
4). A prior conviction, Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 592 F. Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.
1984), see supra note 26, or probable cause, Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667
(N.D. Ga. 1983); Bennett v. E. F. & Hutton Co., No. C83-1502A (N.D. Ohio Nov. 28,
1984), must be alleged with reference to the predicate acts.
5). There is no § 1962(d) claim because there cannot be a conspiracy between a corpo-
ration and its employee, Landmark Savings & Loan v. Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., 527
F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
6). RICO was not meant to supplant fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
Aliberti v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 591 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mass 1984).
7). The complaint did not allege the existence of an "enterprise" apart from the predi-
cate acts comprising the "pattern of racketeering activity." Bennett v. E. F. Hutton & Co., No.
C83-1502A (N.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 1984); In re Catanella and E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 583 F.
Supp. 1388 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
8). Failure to plead fraud with the requisite specificity, see infra note 64.
In the above cases, the issue of respondeat superior liability is not raised. In other cases,
courts find that a RICO claim is stated, but still fail to address respondeat superior. Heinold
Commodities v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. II1. 1979); Jensen v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,
[1983-84 Transfer Binder] FED SEC. L. REP. (CCH) V 99,674 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Kimmel v.
Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (it is not clear if the firm was a defendant);
Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, 567 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Austin v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Mich. 1983); Nunes v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current Developments] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) T 91,999 (D. Md. 1985). See also Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 581 F. Supp. 88
(E.D. Pa. 1983) (court allows RICO claim against registered representative, but not against
firm, because it was the enterprise and not the person under § 1962(c), and because no intra-
corporate conspiracy is possible under § 1962(d)). Witt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., [Current Developments) FED. SEC. L. REP. T 91,970 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (claim
against firm dismissed; it was the enterprise and not the person under § 1962(c)).
54. O'Brien v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 91,509 (D. Ariz. 1984); Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Cal. 1983). Cf.
Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Il1. 1982); Yancoski v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., Inc., 581 F. Supp. 88 (E. Pa. 1983) (claims dismissed as to securities firms in
both cases).
It is the "person employed ... by any enterprise" who is primarily liable under section
1962(c), not the "enterprise." See United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983). Under the most reasonable statutory interpretation, this
"person" is the registered representative who engaged in the illegal activities, and the securities
firm is the "enterprise." An alternative reading is possible: the firm is the "person" and is
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date, courts refuse to attribute the registered representative's miscon-
duct to the employer. Instead, they acknowledge the potential liabil-
ity against a firm only on a fault basis, and only with proof of the
firm's participation in the fraud. In Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc.,"
the district court reasoned that section 1961 only defines an act as
"racketeering" if it is one of the enumerated felonies punishable
under the laws of the United States. The elements of the criminal
offense of aiding and abetting must be established to hold the firm
liable. This requires both knowing participation in the offense and
an interest in the criminal venture." Other courts have held that a
firm would be liable if knowing or intentional participation in the
wrongful acts could be established; 5 these courts did not require ad-
ditionally an interest in the criminal venture. None of these cases has
recognized the possibility of a firm's liability for negligent or reckless
hiring or supervision of its employees."
Furthermore, all the cases have rejected without extended anal-
ysis the possibility that no-fault theories might be available as a basis
for rendering a judgment against the firm without extended analysis.
In O'Brien v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the court, emphasizing
the requirement of knowing participation, simply stated that an em-
ployee's knowledge could not be imputed to the employer.59  The
court in Dakis v. Chapman stressed the concept of intentional partic-
ipation;6 RICO liability would attach to an "aggressor" enterprise
and not to a firm that was merely a "conduit" for the employee's
primarily liable if the misdeeds of its employee are attributable to it. The statutorily required
"enterprise," under this interpretation, would have to be the individual broker, Parnes v. Hei-
nold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 24 ("a strained reverse construction"), or the cus-
tomer or the customer's investment portfolio. See Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 760
(D. Cal. 1983); O'Brien v. Dean Witter Reynolds, slip op. at 7. The latter interpretation is a
strained construction of the statute. But see In re Catanella and E.F. Hutton & Co., 583 F.
Supp. 1388 (E.D. Pa. 1984) ("no conceivable reading of the statutory definition would support
a conclusion that securities accounts qualify as 'enterprises.' "). Moreover, under either inter-
pretation, the same issue is presented, namely whether to attribute the registered representa-
tive's misconduct to the employer.
55. 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984). The court stated that even if a civil standard were
adopted, the enterprise would not have a separate economic existence apart from the pattern of
racketeering activity. The Second Circuit found that the district court erred on this one point.
Id. at 22-23.
56. 553 F. Supp. at 1362.
57. O'Brien v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., No. CIV 82-1605 PHX CLH, slip. op. at 9
(D. Ariz. Mar. 26, 1984); Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 759-60 (D. Cal. 1893).
58. Id.
59. O'Brien v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., No. CIV 82-1605, PHX CLH, slip. op. at
9 (D. Ariz. Mar. 26, 1984).
60. Dakis, 574 F. Supp. at 759-60.
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securities violations."1 In Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc. the
court described the use of respondeat superior in this situation as
"bizarre," noting that the firm itself had been victimized by its un-
scrupulous employee." The tenor of these opinions is sympathy for
the firm and a refusal to add to its injury by permitting liability to
be thrust upon it by the wrongful acts of its employees.63 Thus, these
cases require, at a minimum, knowing participation in the em-
ployee's fraud to hold the firm liable for RICO treble damages.6'
Because the analysis in these cases is so abbreviated, it cannot
be assumed that the respondeat superior theory issue is settled. Re-
jection of respondeat superior liability in this context seems an ab-
rupt departure from modern tort principles; not since the early twen-
tieth century have there been such strong expressions about the
injustice of holding an innocent principal liable for the misdeeds of
its agents.6" Moreover, the policies served by respondeat supe-
rior-loss distribution and deterrence-seem to be furthered by its
application to RICO. Furthermore, Congress provided that RICO is
to be "liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." '66 Fi-
nally, a majority of the circuit courts hold that respondeat superior is
available under the federal securities laws for the predicate offenses
of churning and suitability. Thus, these considerations require strong
arguments for rejecting respondeat superior.
61. Id.
62. Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 24 n.9 (N.D. I11. 1982).
63. Id. at 23-24 n.8.
64. Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires specificity in pleading
fraud. This requirement has been applied to RICO pleadings. Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co.,
572 F. Supp. 667, 682 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Bennett v. E.F. Hutton & Co., No. C83-1502A
(N.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 1984).
Another unresolved issue, assuming that a plaintiff could adequately allege knowing par-
ticipation by the firm, is what difficulties plaintiff might encounter from the possible applica-
tion of antitrust's intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 581
F. Supp. 88, 97 (E.D. Pa. 1983) and Landmark Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Loeb Rhoades, 527 F.
Supp. 206, 209 (E.D. Mich. 1981) applied the doctrine to dismiss § 1962(d) claims, while
Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rejected
the doctrine in a § 1962(d) claim. All these decisions predated the Supreme Court's adoption
of the doctrine in the antitrust area in Copperweld Corp. v. Independent Tube Corp., 1984-2
TRADE CASES (CCH) 66,901 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
65. Holmes "assume[d] that common-sense is opposed to making one man pay for an-
other man's wrong, unless he actually has brought the wrong to pass according to the ordinary
canons of legal responsibility. ... Holmes, Agency 11, 5 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1891). Baty
stated that the real reason for employers' liability is their "deep pocket." T. BATY, VICARIOUS
LIABILITY 154 (1916). Cf Seavey, supra note 45, at 433-35.
66. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a),
84 Stat. 941, 947 (1971).
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III. APPLICATION OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND AGENCY
PRINCIPLES IN OTHER AREAS OF FEDERAL LAW
This section examines the courts' treatment of respondeat supe-
rior liability under other federal statutes. Rather than attempt a
comprehensive examination of the many federal statutory schemes
where the issue has arisen, this section reviews selected federal stat-
utes and ascertains factors courts use to determine whether respon-
deat superior liability should be applied to a particular statute. Anti-
trust law is selected6 7 because Congress frequently referred to its
remedies as a model for RICO's civil remedies."8 Securities laws are
examined,69 because violations of these statutes are the predicate of-
fenses that form the basis of the RICO violation.70 Commodities
laws are examined 1 because the violations are similar to securities
violations, and, again, can form the basis of a RICO violation.7 2
While less relevant, the treatment of respondeat superior under civil
rights statutes73 shows the emphasis given to statutory language and
legislative history. Finally, cases arising under other federal statutes
are reviewed: employment discrimination,74 labor law, 75 and false
claims.76
There is a general judicial acceptance for applying common law
agency principles to federal statutes.77 Nevertheless, courts recognize
that congressional intent must prevail and thus they look to the stat-
utory language in the first instance to determine that intent. In some
instances, as under section 1983 of Civil Rights Act, the literal lan-
guage will supply an all but conclusive answer. In other instances, as
in antitrust law, the statute is silent as to intent, or subject to differ-
67. See infra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
68. E.g., 116 CONG. REC. 35,196, 35,197, 35,201, 35,295.
69. See infra notes 88-106 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 107-26 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
77. American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 567, 569
(1982). But see Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981) and
Texas Ind. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981), where the court found no contri-
bution under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and § 4 of the
Clayton Act. The court reasoned that Congress expressly created these private damages actions
and failed to provide for contribution, although the express contribution provisions in the se-
curities laws Securites Act § 11(0, 15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(0(1933) and Securities Act § 18(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78(i)(e)(1934) demonstrated that Congress knew how to do this when it wished.
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ent interpretations, as under the securities and commodities statutes.
Courts will then examine legislative history to aid in interpreting the
statutory language. Finally, the courts will analyze the legislative
purpose to determine if the statutory purposes would be furthered by
application of respondeat superior.
In addition, courts have expressed sympathy for the principal
who is made to pay for his agents' transgressions. This attitude par-
allels earlier arguments opposing respondeat superior theory. 8 This
has led to a dilution of classic respondeat superior theory, especially
in the areas of employment discrimination and labor relations.
A fifth factor is whether courts characterize the statute as com-
pensatory or penal. In the latter instances, courts show a greater re-
luctance to impose respondeat superior liability on a principal, as
illustrated by case law under the false claims act.
A. Antitrust Law
Congress frequently referred to the civil remedies of the anti-
trust statutes as a model for RICO's civil remedies,7 9 and RICO's
treble damages remedy bears a close resemblance to the antitrust
remedy. Thus, examining the application of common law agency
principles under the antitrust law seems especially appropriate.
In American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel
Corp.,80 the United States Supreme Court held that a nonprofit
standard-setting organization was civilly liable for treble damages for
the acts of its agents which were within the agents' apparent author-
ity.9" The Court first examined general rules of agency law and
stated that these principles have "long been the settled rule in the
federal system."'82 It then found that Congress intended the antitrust
laws to have broad remedial effect in order to encourage competition.
Hence, courts should apply general agency principles that would
further this intent.88 The Court emphasized that the imposition of
liability would have a deterrent effect on the organization and that
this would provide an incentive to insure that similar anticompetitive
78. See generally T. BATY, VICARIous LIABILITY (1916).
79. See supra note 68.
80. 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
81. Members of the society had prepared and disseminated an advisory opinion that a
competitor's safety device for boilers did not satisfy the code's requirements. Respondeat supe-
rior liability was not applicable since the individuals acted solely because of personal motives
and therefore not within the scope of their employment. See supra notes 34-35 and 40-41 and
accompanying text.
82. 456 U.S. at 567.
83. Id. at 569.
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practices would not occur in the future. 4
The defendant argued that traditional agency principles did not
hold a principal liable in tort actions involving punitive damages.8 5
The Court rejected this argument, emphasizing the deterrent pur-
pose of the treble damages remedy and de-emphasizing its punitive
aspects.86 Thus, as the dissent correctly noted, "[t]he underlying
theme of the Court's opinion seems to be that any rule of agency law
that widens the net of antitrust enforcement and liability should be
adopted." '87
B. Securities Law
Because the predicate acts that are the basis of the RICO viola-
tion are federal securities violations, and principally section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act and its Rule 10b-5,88 judicial discussion of respon-
deat superior liability in this area provides an analogy.89 There is,
84. Id. at 572.
85. Id. at 574-75.
86. Id. at 575.
87. Id. at 590. The opinion was a 5-1-3 decision, with Chief Justice Burger concurring
in the result only, and Justice Powell writing a dissent. Justice Powell was concerned about
the consequences of extending the exposure of nonprofit organizations that perform valuable
functions, such as setting industry safety standards, to treble damage liability. Id. at 586. In
addition, he reviewed the law of agency as it existed at the time of enactment of the Sherman
Act and found it inapplicable to nonprofit organizations and in punitive damage actions. Id. at
586-89. Finally, he argued that under substantive law he found no conspiracy, since the society
was as much a victim of plaintiff's competitors as plaintiff was. Id. at 592 n.18.
88. See supra notes 13-16, 21 and accompanying text.
89. There is extensive case law on this issue. Respondeat superior applicable: Paul F.
Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980) (employee of broker-
age firm engaged in market manipulation); Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir.
1976) (brokerage firm's employee sold unregistered securities); Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.
2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974) (brokerage firm churned customer's account); Marbury Management,
Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980) (brokerage firm's
trainee made misrepresentations as to his expertise) (opinion discusses prior cases in Second
Circuit, which were conflicting). In the First Circuit, A.J. White & Co. v. SEC, 556 F.2d 619
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977), and Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542 (1st Cir.
1978), are often cited for the proposition, although they are not directly on point; Kravitz v.
Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1978) is on point (brokerage
firm's employee churned customer's account). In Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir.
1975), the Fourth Circuit applied respondeat superior principles to hold a brokerage firm
liable for its employee's churning, but one district court believes that this decision was over-
ruled in Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
868 (1979), although the latter opinion is concerned solely with controlling a person's liability
and has nothing to do with respondeat superior, since the employee had left the firm at the
time of the transactions causing the plaintiff's harm. Compare Haynes v. Anderson & Strud-
wick, 508 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Va. 1981) (Carras overruled) with Frankel v. Wyllie &
Thronhill, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Va. 1982) (Carras not overruled). In the Third
Circuit, Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
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however, a significant difference between RICO and the Exchange
Act. The private remedy under section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 is judi-
cially implied; thus, the courts have more extensively relied on policy
considerations in interpreting the scope of the remedy." Congress,
on the other hand, expressly provided for private enforcement of
RICO. Therefore, statutory language and Congressional intent-not
the judiciary's perception of appropriate policy-should determine
the remedy's scope.
In addition, analysis of the applicability of respondeat superior
principles to the Rule 10b-5 remedy is complicated by section 20(a)
of the Exchange Act, which imposes liability on "controlling per-
sons" but affords them a "good faith" defense.9 The courts are di-
vided as to whether Congress intended the controlling persons provi-
sion to be the exclusive basis for imposing liability on employers for
their employees' misdeeds, which would require the interpretation
that Congress rejected the use of respondeat superior principles.
While the Supreme Court, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States," held that a bank was vicariously liable for the Rule 10b-5
938 (1982), held that a firm would be liable for its employee's wrongful acts where its conduct
is likely to exert strong influence on important investment decisions, as in the case of a broker-
age firm or where the employee is a high level officer or director, or both. Id. at 181-82. There
an accounting firm was held liable for misstatements contained in a tax opinion used to market
a tax shelter program. While Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975) is
cited as stating the general rule of the circuit of the nonapplicability of respondeat superior, a
reading of the facts in the case makes it clear that respondeat superior was there inapplicable
because the corporate officer was not acting in the scope of his employment. Both the lower
and circuit court opinions acknowledged this. The positions of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits
are unclear. In Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968), the court refers to common law agency principles, but it is unclear whether it is relying
on agency principles or § 20(a) of the Exchange Act to find defendants liable. The Tenth
Circuit, in Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974), apparently be-
lieved that state law agency concepts should be applied to hold a corporation liable for its
president's fraud and deceit.
The only circuit that flatly denies any application of respondeat superior principles, the
Ninth, does so in reliance on an opinion which did not present the issue, Kamen v. Paul H.
Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1967). See
Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978) (law of this circuit that §
20(a) supplants vicarious liability of employer for acts of employee under respondeat superior);
Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. (1975)), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025.
90. For years, the prevalent approach in the lower courts was to view the scope of Rule
lOb-5 expansively, but in recent years the Supreme Court has reversed this trend by emphasiz-
ing that the remedy is an implied one. E.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 734-36 (1975).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1982).
92. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). A few opinions do cite Affiliated Ute as authority, e.g., Carras
v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 260-61 (4th Cir. 1975); Fey v. Walston & Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 1036,
1053 (7th Cir. 1974).
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violations of its employees, circuit courts have not viewed this deci-
sion as controlling. Disregard of Supreme Court precedent is appro-
priate here, because the Court decided the issue without analysis.9"
In addition, Affiliated Ute predates the Supreme Court's opinions on
Rule 10b-5 which pay closer attention to the statute as a whole and
attempt to harmonize the implied remedy with the express
remedies. 94
The two best arguments for rejection are consistent with the
Supreme Court's trend to restrict the scope of Rule 10b-5's implied
remedy by emphasizing the statutory framework. First, the Supreme
Court, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,95 concluded, after examin-
ing both the language of section 10(b) and the overall statutory
scheme, that primary liability under Rule lOb-5 required scienter.
Opponents of respondeat superior argue from this that no-fault lia-
bility is antithetical to the statute.96 This conclusion, however, does
not distinguish between primary and secondary liability. Hochfelder
holds that no one is liable under Rule 10b-5 unless the primary vio-
lator acted with scienter; nevertheless, Hochfelder does not mandate
the conclusion that scienter is required to impose secondary liability
on the primary violator's principal.
The second argument for rejecting respondeat superior exam-
ines the legislative history and concludes that Congress intended to
restrict the scope of vicarious liability when it enacted section 20(a)
of the Exchange Act. While the Senate version of the section con-
tained an "insurer's liability" standard, the House version, which
was subsequently adopted, proposed a "fiduciary standard" which
93. "The liability of the bank, of course, is coextensive with that of [employees] Gale
and Haslem." Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 154.
94. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Santa Fe Indus., Inc.,v. Green, 430
U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
95. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
96. Id. at 212. The argument derived from Hochfelder is set forth at Fischel, Secondary
Liability Under § 10(b), 69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 88 (1981); see also Fitzpatrick & Carmen,
Respondeat Superior and the Federal Securities Laws: A Round Peg in a Square Hole, 12
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 2 (1983) (respondeat superior inapplicable). For contrasting views, see
Ferrara & Sanger, Derivative Liability in Securities Law: Controlling Person Liability, Re-
spondeat Superior, and Aiding and Abetting, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1007 (1983);
Musewicz, .Vicarious Employer Liability and § 10(b): In Defense of the Common Law, 50
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 754 (1982); Note, Rule lOb-5 and Vicarious Liability Based on Re-
spondeat Superior, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1513 (1981) (respondeat superior applicable). The semi-
nal piece in the area, which predates Hochfelder, is Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities
Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification and
Contribution, 10 U. PA. L. REV. 597 (1972).
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imposed a duty of due care. 97 Adoption of the House version makes
it clear that Congress intended liability to be imposed on controlling
persons only if they participated in the controlled persons' fraud. 8
Application of respondeat superior principles, therefore, would nul-
lify the "good faith" defense of section 20(a) and would be contrary
to this legislative intent. On the other hand, in the view of courts
applying respondeat superior, Congress's intent, in enacting section
20(a), was to impose liability on persons who actually control the
wrongdoer but would not be reachable under common law agency
principles. Because the statute extended liability beyond that under
the common law, Congress provided affected persons with the statu-
tory defense of due care.99 Congress intended, however, that tradi-
tional agency principles would apply under the statute.
Apart from the Ninth, all the circuits that have considered the
question have applied respondeat superior principles, at least in
some circumstances.1"' They have emphasized the legislation's reme-
dial nature and goal of protecting investors.10 To achieve this goal
the courts have applied common law agency principles.102 Congress,
these courts reason, could not have intended section 20(a) to insulate
97. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933).
98. Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 885 (3d Cir. 1975); Lanza v.
Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973). For current views in the Third and
Second Circuits, see, respectively, Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982), and Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980).
99. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980);
Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011
(1980); Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., Inc., 594 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 868 (1979); Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass.
1978).
100. See supra note 89.
101. Paul F.Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118 (5th Cir.
1980); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1011 (1980); Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 694-695 (6th Cir. 1976); Carroll v.
First National Bank of Lincolnwood, 413 F.2d 353, 358 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1003 (1970); Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, 447 F. Supp. 203, 214 (D. Mass.
1978).
102. Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118
(5th Cir.); Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 694-95 (6th Cir. 1976); Fey v. Walston &
Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1052 (7th Cir. 1974).
As authority for this proposition, some of the opinions rely on § 28(a) of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982) and § 16 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1982) which
merely make it clear that state remedies are not affected by the federal statutes. Marbury
Management v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Paul
F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980).
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firms from the misdeeds of their employees,103 particularly where the
nature of the employer's business is such that it is likely to affect the
investing public, like a brokerage firm.1 ' Several opinions empha-
size that the investor may have selected the firm for its reputation,
and not for the registered representative he dealt with.'" Hence, the
firm itself actually provided the opportunity for the employee to de-
fraud the customer and the firm should be held liable for that em-
ployee's fraud.'06
C. Commodities Law
Commodities fraud offenses, typically involving churning and
unsuitability allegations' brought under the Commodity Exchange
Act (the "CEA"),0 8 are the common predicate offenses which un-
derly many RICO actions. The applicability of respondeat superior
to the CEA is unsettled. Policy arguments similar to those support-
ing the application of respondeat superior in securities law may be
made,' 09 but resolution of the issue in commodities law will probably
be resolved through judicial determination of the appropriate rela-
tionship among the several statutory provisions.
Prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Curran v. Merrill
Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith,'" courts had split on whether to im-
ply a private claim for damages under the CEA."' Curran held that
there was such an implied remedy, and because of its concern about
103. Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 916 (1974). Another court feared that unless respondeat superior was recognized,
accounting firms would have an incentive to create a "Chinese wall" between the partners and
employees, with only the latter drafting opinions, Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175
(3d Cir. 1981).
104. Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 181 (3rd Cir. 1981); Paul F. Newton
& Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118-19 (5th Cir. 1980); Holloway v.
Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 695 (6th Cir. 1976).
105. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 639 F.2d 1111, 1118-19 (5th
Cir. 1980); Holloway v. Howerdd 537 F.2d 690, 696 (6th Cir. 1976).
106. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118-19 (6th
Cir. 1976).
107. Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc. 548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Heinold
Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Jensen v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., [1983-84 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) V 99,674 (C.D. Cal. 1984);
Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCommodity Services, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Plain-
tiffs rely on violations of the mail and wire fraud statutes to establish the requisite predicate
offenses. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
108. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982).
109. See supra notes 101-106 and accompanying text.
110. 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
1.11. For a full discussion of the state of the law prior to Curran, see Leist v. Simplot,
638 F.2d 283, 296-302 (2d Cir. 1980), which was one of the opinions affirmed in Curran.
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the uncertain scope of the implied remedy,11 the commodities indus-
try pressured Congress to provide certainty by enacting express rem-
edies which would be exclusive. Congress did so in the 1982 amend-
ments to the CEA.11' Section 22 of the CEA1"4 gives a customer a
cause of action for damages against his broker or advisor for churn-
ing, as well as against anyone "who willfully aids, abets, counsels,
induces, or procures the commission" of the churning.11 In addition,
the 1982 amendments provide, in section 13(a),"' that willful aiders
and abettors are liable along with primary violators in both adminis-
trative and private suits." 7 Section 13(b) of the amended CEA" 8
imposes liability in administrative actions on controlling persons for
the violations of the controlled persons, provided that the Commodi-
ties Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") proves that the con-
trolling person did not act in good faith or did knowingly induce the
violation. 1 Finally, section 22(a) provides that the statutory reme-
dies are exclusive.120
The inclusion, in sections 13(a) and 13(b), of some forms of
derivative liability suggests that Congress did not intend respondeat
superior as a basis of liability. This argument is strengthened by
section 22(a). On the other hand, section 2(a)(1)(A) of the CEA12 1 is
located in the definitional section, and as interpreted by the CFTC
and by the courts prior to the 1982 amendments, 2 2 codifies the doc-
trine of respondeat superior as it applies to the statute by providing
that an agent's act within the scope of his employment is the act of
the principal. This provision has been part of the statute since 1922
and was unchanged by the 1982 amendments.
112. The Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n took the position that no additional
statutory remedies were necessary after Curran and did not undertake to develop statutory
language for private rights of action. H.R. REP. No. 565 (Pt. I), 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 157,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3871, 4006.
113. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 235, 96 Stat. 2294, 2322
(1983).
114. 7 U.S.C. § 25 (1982).
115. 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1) (1982).
116. 7 U.S.C. § 13c(a) (1982).
117. Id.
118. 7 U.S.C. § 13c(b)(2) (1982).
119. Id.
120. 7 U.S.C. § 25 (a)(2) (1982).
121. 7 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
122. Poplar Grove Planting & Refining Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 465 F. Supp
585, 589 (M.D. La.), remanded on other grounds, 600 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1979); CFTC v.
Commodities Fluctuations System, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1382, 1383 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See gener-
ally Markham and Meltzer, Secondary Liability Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 27 EM-
ORY L.J. 1115 (1978).
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Moreover, the legislative history of the 1982 amendments adds
to the confusion. The House report stated that section 13(b) was
added to enable the CFTC "to reach behind corporate or partner-
ship entities" in order to impose sanctions on the persons that insti-
gate the violations. The report compared that section to the control-
ling persons provision in the federal securities laws.12 This language
supports an interpretation of section 13(b) as an additional liability
provision, and would treat the section consistently with the view of
the majority of the circuits regarding the controlling persons provi-
sions in the federal securities laws.1 24 On the other hand, the com-
mittee report, in discussing section 13(b), stated that respondeat su-
perior did not coexist with the controlling person liability imposed
by that section because the section was drafted to protect controlling
persons against too expansive a scope of liability. 5 The committee
report apparently states that respondeat superior is not applicable to
commodities fraud violations. But such a view requires that section
2(a)(1)(A) be read out of the statute. In all likelihood, the committee
report intended that respondeat superior principles should not be
used to impose liability on controlling persons where the common
law would not be applicable; i.e., the controlling person provision
imposes liability on persons not reachable under section 2(a)(1)(A).
Respondeat superior would then continue to be applicable in private
123. H.R. REP. No. 565 (pt. 1), 94th Cong, 2d Sess. 53, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3891, 3902. ("Among other things, this provision would strengthen the
Commission's ability to impose sanctions against individuals who are, in essence, the alter egos
of corporations which have duties under the Act."). See also id. at 142, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CONG. & AD. NEWs at 3991 (§ 13(b) liability of an executive officer of a corporation or a
supervising employee).
124. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
125. "[Section 2(a)(1)] has been included in the Act for many years and in essence pro-
vides respondeat superior and general principal-agent standards for imposing liability on em-
ployers and principals for the acts of their employees or agents. The conferees intend that this
section not be used as a basis for imputing liability to a controlling person of a firm for acts of
an employee or agent of the firm since it does not include the protections that have carefully
been articulated in the Conference substitute and would make a nullity of that provision."
H.R. REP. No. 964, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4055, 4066; H.R. REP. No. 565 (pt. 1), 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 105, reprinted in 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3871, 3954.
The inclusion of this language may be explained by the legislative history of § 13(b). The
issue of who would have the burden of proof in establishing the controlling person's good faith
or lack of it was debated. The CFTC lost its effort to place the burden on the controlling
person to show he acted in good faith and did not induce the violation. Congressional concern
was expressed that the CFTC might use § 2(a)(1) to establish liability of a controlling person
for acts of those under his control; the CFTC gave its assurance that this would not be at-
tempted. H.R. REP. No. 565 (Pt. 1), 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 142, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3871, 3454.
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actions under the CEA, because section 13(b) is only applicable to
actions brought by the CFTC, and probably in administrative ac-
tions as well.""
D. Civil Rights Law
While the civil rights statutes are not substantively related to
RICO, the judicial treatment of respondeat superior liability under
these provisions is worthy of examination because it provides a strik-
ing example of the Supreme Court's emphasis on statutory language
and legislative history.
In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 2 7 the Supreme
Court stated, in dictum, that a local government could not be held
liable on a respondeat superior theory under the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. It emphasized that the statutory lan-
guage128 plainly imposed liability on a government when its em-
ployee violated someone's civil rights by following that government's
official policy. Nevertheless, the Court found that the statutory lan-
guage could not easily be read to impose vicarious liability on a gov-
ernment merely because it employed someone who violated another's
rights. " 9
Monell is also an example of the use of legislative history to
support a statutory interpretation. The Court noted that Congress
specifically rejected a form of vicarious liability when it adopted the
civil rights act, and was motivated partly by concerns about its con-
stitutionality. While recognizing that rejection of one form of respon-
deat superior liability does not necessarily imply rejection of another
form, the Court nevertheless found that "the inference that Congress
126. Even if Congress meant to eliminate respondeat superior altogether, a committee
report cannot delete a provision from the statute. A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURI-
TIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 4.6(463)(13) (1984).
127. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monell involved female employees of the Dep't of Social
Servs. and the Bd. of Educ. of New York City who brought a class action against the Depart-
ment and its Commissioner, the Board and its Chancellor, and the City of New York and its
Mayor, charging that the Board and the Department had, as a matter of official policy, com-
pelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence without regard to medical reasons.
128. Any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage of any State subjects, or causes to be subjected, any person . . . to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion . . ..shall . . . be liable . . . to the party injured in any action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978) (emphasis added).
129. 436 U.S. at 692. "Indeed, the fact that Congress did specifically provide that A's
tort became B's liability if B 'caused' A to subject another to a tort suggests that Congress did
not intend § 1983 liability to attach where such causation was absent." Id.
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did not intend to impose such liability was quite strong." 3' More-
over, while the remedial purposes of section 1983 would be furthered
by application of respondeat superior, through both of the doctrine's
underlying justifications-loss distribution and deterrence-the
Court concluded that Congress was aware of these considerations
and had implicitly rejected them."'
Monell has been extended to allegations of civil rights depriva-
tions under other federal statutes3 2 and to actions brought directly
under the Constitution.' Courts have even extended Monell to pre-
clude civil rights suits against private employers for the torts of its
employees which violate the Constitution. These courts find no basis
to distinguish between municipal and private corporations. 4 This
development marks a significant departure from common law re-
spondeat superior principles.
E. Employment Discrimination Law
Courts express conflicting views on the use of respondeat supe-
rior to hold employers liable for the discriminatory acts of their em-
ployees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.' 3 5 The statute's def-
inition of "employer" includes agents of that employer, 3 6 and some
courts have relied on this as clear evidence of congressional intent to
provide for respondeat superior liability. 3 Some courts have also
emphasized the statute's broad humanitarian and remedial pur-
pose. '8 Other courts have noted that failure to hold an employer
liable for the discriminatory conduct of its employees would create a
loophole in the statute.' 9
130. 436 U.S. at 693 n.57.
131. 436 U.S. at 693-94.
132. E.g., DeShields v. United States Parole Commission, 593 F. 2d 354 (8th Cir.
1979); 18 U.S.C. § 4208.
133. E.g., Berry v. McLemore, 670 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1982); Jones v. City of Memphis,
586 F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 914 (1979).
134. Powell v. Shopco Laurel Co., 678 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1982); Iskander v. Vil-
lage of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982).
135. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e-17 (1982).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982).
137. E.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979).
138. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The court did not, however,
apply no-fault respondeat superior liability; it held instead that the employer would only be
liable for the discriminatory practices of supervisory personnel and would be relieved of liabil-
ity if supervisory personnel contravened the employer's policies without its knowledge and if it
rectified the situation when it became aware of it. Id. at 993. See also Tomkins v. Public Serv.
Electric & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
139. Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d at 213, (9th Cir. 1979). Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (1lth Cir. 1982).
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Conversely, courts have been concerned with the harshness of
holding employers liable for what may be viewed as the personal
derelictions of their employees, over which the employer may have
no control.1 40 This concern has led some courts to hold that the dis-
criminatory acts were outside the scope of employment or were
wholly motivated by personal malice and therefore were not attribu-
table to the employer."' Some courts that purport to apply respon-
deat superior do not do so on a no-fault basis; thus many cases state
that an employer would not be liable if the employee violated com-
pany policy without the employer's knowledge and if the employer
took remedial action after discovering the violation. 142 Even those
courts that do apply classic respondeat superior theory limit its ap-
plication to violations committed by supervisory personnel.1 43
F. Labor Law
Attempts by management to invalidate union elections because
of the improper conduct of individuals campaigning for the union
present the respondeat superior issue in the labor law area. Here
also the caselaw conflicts. On the one hand, like Title VII, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act defines "employer" to include the agents
of the employer,"' and this can be seen as evidence that Congress
intended respondeat superior to apply. 45 On the other hand, courts
are concerned here, as with Title VII actions, with the harshness of
attributing an individual's misconduct to the union, particularly
where the individual may be a volunteer not readily subject to the
union's control. Thus, the courts base liability upon consideration of
two factors: first, the relationship between the individual and the
140. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982). In Henson, the
court drew a distinction between cases in which the employee was threatened by loss of em-
ployment or tangible job benefits unless sexual favors were granted and cases in which the
employee was subjected to a hostile work environment. In the former case, the harasser is
relying on his position of power to discriminate and it is appropriate to hold the employer
liable; in the latter case, his ability to harass is not necessarily enhanced by the authority
conferred upon him by the employer and therefore, he is probably insulting the victims for his
own reasons and by his own means. Id. at 910.
141. Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), rev'd and
remanded on other grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) ("nothing more than a personal
proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism").
142. See supra note 138.
143. Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d at 213 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F.2d at 993; (D.C. Cir. 1977) and Tomkins v. Public Serv. Electric Gas Co., 568
F.2d at 1048 (3d Cir. 1977).
144. 29 U.S.C. §152(2) (1982); see also 29 U.S.C. § 152(13) (1982).
145. N.L.R.B v Urban Telephone Corp., 499 F.2d 239, 243-44 (7th Cir. 1974).
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union, and second, the action taken by the union, if any, to repudiate
the wrongful conduct.14 In addition, courts have considered whether
the union could have foreseen the violations. 4 Consequently even in
those decisions that purport to apply respondeat superior principles,
the courts are strongly influenced by factors indicating fault on the
part of the principal.
G. False Claims Act
United States v. Ridglea State Bank 48 was an action brought
by the government under the False Claims Act' 49 to recover a statu-
tory penalty from two banks because of fraudulent loan applications
approved by an employee. In refusing to impute the employee's
knowledge of the fraud to the banks, the court analyzed the distinc-
tion between a civil action for compensatory damages and one for a
penalty, and characterized the latter as a criminal action. In civil
actions for compensatory damages, respondeat superior liability is
imposed for two reasons: first, it encourages careful supervision of
the employees, and second, because a third person suffered a loss,
and the employer can absorb that loss more easily than his agent. 5
In penal actions, however, the considerations are different because
potential criminal punishment serves as a deterrent to an employee
who, for lack of assets, may not be deterred by the prospect of civil
liability.' 5' Further, when relief is in the form of a penalty, the pol-
icy of fair loss allocation is not present.'
IV. APPLICATION OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND AGENCY
PRINCIPLES TO RICO
To determine the appropriateness of applying respondeat supe-
rior principles to RICO, the five factors derived from Part II's dis-
cussion will be analyzed: 1) RICO's language, 2) its legislative his-
tory, 3) its purpose, 4) sympathy for the principal, and 5) the
compensation-penalty distinction.
146. N.L.R.B. v Georgetown Dress Corp., 537 F.2d 1239, 1244; N.L.R.B. v. Urban
Telephone Corp., 499 F.2d 239, 243-44 (7th Cir. 1974).
147. N.L.R.B. v. Georgetown Dress Corp., 537 F.2d 1239, 1244 (4th Cir. 1976) ("We
cannot say [the violations] were not of the nature that a union might not expect from unsophis-
ticated, untrained workers in a hard-fought campaign.").
148. 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966).
149. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1982).
150. Id. at 499.
151. Id.
152. Id.
1984]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
A. Statutory Language
Three arguments may be made that RICO's statutory language
does not support respondeat superior liability. First, RICO contains
no statutory provision which explicitly authorizes the application of
respondeat superior principles. While this could be evidence that
Congress did not intend courts to apply these principles, " ' the pres-
ence or absence of such language has not been particularly important
in deciding the issue in the context of other statutes. Antitrust law
contains no respondeat superior language, but American Society of
Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp."0 4 is a strong statement
for reading respondeat superior principles into a federal statute. The
CEA, " ' Title VII" and the National Labor Relations Act 5 7 con-
tain provisions that support application of respondeat superior prin-
ciples; nevertheless, the law in these areas is unsettled. In employ-
ment discrimination and labor relations cases, in particular, although
many courts purport to apply respondeat superior, there has been a
substantial transformation of the doctrine from a no-fault to a fault
doctrine."'
Second, some courts have interpreted "racketeering activity" in
section 1961(1)'"I to require active participation in the fraud on the
part of the principal. 6 This reading of the statute is supported by
the presence of the express prohibition, in section 1962(d), 6 ' against
conspiring to violate the other provisions of section 1962. This sug-
gests that Congress did not intend to make nonconspirators liable.
On the other hand, RICO's "liberal construction" clause is some evi-
dence of congressional intent that the civil remedies should be
broadly applicable and not limited to criminal activity. 62
Finally, the Supreme Court, in Monell v. Department of Social
153. Cf Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91-95 (1981);
Texas Ind. v Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 646-47 (1981), discussed supra note 77.
154. 456 U.S. 556 (1982) . See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
155. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982). See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
156. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1982). See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 140-43, 146-47 and accompanying text.
159. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982), amended by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1020, 98 Stat. 2143.
160. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1362 (S.D.N.Y.), affd on other
grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984); O'Brien v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., CIV 82-1605 PHX CLH, slip. op. at 9 (D. Ariz. Mar. 26, 1984);
Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 760 (N.D.Cal. 1983).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982).
162. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §
904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1971).
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Services,'63 emphasized reading the substantive provision of the stat-
ute to determine whether or not the words naturally lent themselves
to respondeat superior theory. Under Monell's approach, a strong
argument can be made that only a strained reading of the statute
would support respondeat superior liability. According to section
1962(c), it is "unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in .. .interstate or foreign commerce,
to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of unlawful debt."164 Thus, the sole wrongdoer under the
statute is the employee-associate; it is a strained reading to extend
liability to the enterprise itself. Moreover, because the primary viola-
tor is an employee or associate, and Congress was supposedly aware
of respondeat superior principles, it could have expressly authorized
their application under this provision if it so intended.
B. Legislative History
Monell also provides an example of how legislative history can
support a statutory interpretation. Though the third argument in the
previous section based on statutory language is the strongest, even it
still may not be convincing, because it requires attributing to Con-
gress a greater awareness of common law doctrine than perhaps is
warranted. The frequent references in the legislative history to
RICO's purpose of protecting legitimate businesses strengthens the
argument that Congress did not intend to impose liability on such
businesses."6 5
Under section 1962(c), three hypothetical situations are possi-
ble: 1) the enterprise may be completely tainted if all the employees
are following a policy of wrongdoing directed by top management; 2)
the enterprise may be the victim of the wrongdoing, where it has
been infiltrated by a few employees whose illicit conduct inflicts
harm on the enterprise; or 3) the enterprise may simply provide a
setting for the wrongdoing, being neither an aggressor nor a victim.
163. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
164. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982) (emphasis added).
165. 116 CONG. REc. 953 (1970) (comments of Sen. Thurmond); id. at 35,327 (com-
ments of Sen. Randall); id. at 35,328 (comments of Sen. Meskill); id. at 35,361-62 (comments
of Sen. Pepper); Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals, Relat-
ing to the Control of Organized Crime in the United States, Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan); id. at
157, 170 (statement of John Mitchell); id. at 406, 408 (statement of U.S. Chamber of
Commerce).
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In the first instance, the enterprise should be liable as a primary
violator under either section 1962(c) or section 1962(d), the conspir-
acy section. Accordingly, liability under respondeat superior need not
be considered. The second situation was the primary concern of Con-
gress; there is considerable discussion in the legislative history about
protecting legitimate business from the infiltration of racketeering el-
ements. 66 Requiring the victimized enterprise to pay treble damages
to an injured third party is antithetical to this purpose,1 67 as this
would cause additional injury to an enterprise already weakened by
the corrupting employees. Indeed, it could be argued that only the
enterprise has standing to sue for its injuries, although the cases to
date have rejected this contention. "
Finally, the third possibility-when the enterprise has neither
participated in nor been wronged by the fraud-presents the strong-
est case for application of traditional respondeat superior doctrine.
There is nothing in the legislative history indicating Congress' con-
sideration of any except the second situation. This fact lends addi-
tional support to the argument rejecting respondeat superior set forth
in the preceding section on statutory language. On the other hand,
the Supreme Court has held that the enterprises referred to in the
statute include not only legitimate ones, but illegitimate ones as
well.? 9 That interpretation weakens the argument that Congress
was solely concerned with protecting the enterprise.
C. Statutory Purposes
If the statutory language, supplemented by examination of leg-
islative history, decides the issue as to respondent superior's applica-
bility, it is unnecessary to examine the legislative purposes behind
the statute. Thus, for example, Monell contains no discussion of any
policy rationale for its conclusion to reject respondeat superior.
When, however, the statutory language and legislative history are
silent on the question, as in American Society of Mechanical Engi-
neers v. Hydrolevel Corp.,170 or are inconclusive, as under the fed-
eral securities laws1 7 1 and commodities laws,'7 2 it is appropriate to
inquire into whether respondeat superior would further the purposes
166. See authorities cited supra note 165.
167. See Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 23-24 (N.D. I11. 1982).
168. See Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 760 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
169. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-93 (1981).
170. 456 U.S. 556 (1982). See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
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of the legislation.
RICO's legislative history repeatedly recites that the statute's
purpose is to stop the infiltration of racketeers into legitimate busi-
ness.1"' The primary beneficiary of the statute is the general public,
who must bear the adverse effects of the infiltration.1"' An additional
beneficiary is the invaded business itself, which is cleansed of the
corrupting influence.17 " A third beneficiary is the private plaintiff
under section 1964(c).
There is a conflict between the interests of the first two benefi-
ciaries and the third. Congress probably did not recognize this con-
flict, perhaps because of the late addition of the private remedy."'
The general public and legitimate businesses are best served by plac-
ing liability for treble damages solely on the RICO violator; he will
be financially ruined, without injury to the enterprise, which has, by
hypothesis, already been weakened by the corrupting element and
would be further weakened by imposition of liability. Conversely, a
private plaintiff's interests are probably best served by imposing re-
spondeat superior liability on the firm, because the chances of collec-
tion presumably are greater. Because loss distribution is the princi-
pal rationale for respondeat superior, it is important to determine
whether or not it is compatible with the policies of RICO. The pur-
pose behind RICO is to destroy the racketeering element that has
infiltrated legitimate business.1 7  This purpose is antithetical to a
philosophy of loss-spreading, and suggests that injuries occasioned by
RICO violators should not be viewed as ordinary business losses to
be spread over society as a whole. Certainly, the worker-protection
173. E.g., 116 CONG. REc. 591 (1970) (comments of Sen. McClellan); id. at 602 (com-
ments of Sen. Hruska); id. at 603 (comments of Sen. Yarborough); id. at 607 (comments of
Sen. Byrd); id. at 854; id. at 36,296 (comments of Sen. Dole); id. at 35,196 (comments of Sen.
Celler); id. at 35,201 (comments by Rep. Poll); id. at 35,295 (comments by Rep. PofO; id. at
35,304 (comments of Sen. Railsbeck); id. at 6709 (comments of Rep. Poff).
174. Id. at 591 (comments of Sen. McClellan); id. at 602-603 (comments of Sen.
Hruska); id. at 607 (comments of Sen. Byrd); id. at 820 (comments of Rep. Scott); id. at
36,396 (comments of Rep. Fannin); id. at 35,201 (comments of Rep. Poff); id. at 35,328
(comments of Rep. Meskill).
175. Id. at 953 (comments of Sen. Thurmond); id. at 35,295 (comments of Rep. Poff);
id. at 35,327 (comments of Rep. Randell).
176. The version of the bill passed by the Senate on Jan. 23, 1970 did not contain a
private remedy. Section 1964(c) was added in the amended version of the bill passed by the
House on Oct. 7, 1970. See id. at 35,227. The Senate concurred in the House amendment
without discussion on Oct. 12, 1970. Id. at 36,296.
177. Id. at 591 (comments of Sen. McClellan); id. at 602-03 (comments of Sen.
Hruska); id. at 607 (comments of Sen. Byrd); id. at 36,296 (comments of Sen. Dole); id. at
35,295 (comments of Rep. Poff); id. at 35,304. (Sen. Railsbeck, commenting on special mes-
sage sent by Pres. Nixon to Congress on organized crime (April 23, 1969)).
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aspect of respondeat superior"' is inapposite here, as these workers,
by definition, are racketeers.
On the other hand, such a conclusion may seem objectionable
because, if the RICO violator cannot be sued or cannot pay, the loss
falls upon the third party. There are two answers to this objection.
First, the compensatory aspect of the statute seems secondary to the
punitive aspect, as discussed below.'79 Second, in the case of churn-
ing and suitability claims, the victim may pursue other remedies that
will compensate him for his injury under securities or commodities
laws; where respondeat superior may be available.' 80 Thus, he may
be able to obtain compensation for his injuries; what he will lose is
RICO's treble damages award and attorney's fees. 8 '
As to the deterrence rationale for respondeat superior-an im-
portant consideration in the securities and commodities laws-it can
be argued that liability under respondeat superior would provide a
greater incentive to deter racketeering activity within an organiza-
tion. Nothing in the legislative history, however, suggests that Con-
gress considered strengthening business' incentive to resist employees'
racketeering activities. Congress may well have thought that no addi-
tional encouragement was needed because legitimate businesses
would naturally resist invasion by racketeers. Again, when the un-
derlying predicate offenses are violations of the securities and com-
modities laws, there are already incentives to encourage brokerage
firms to supervise their employees.' 82
D. Sympathy for the Firm
As noted above, the few opinions dealing with respondeat supe-
rior liability in the RICO securities fraud actions express sympathy
for a firm that has liability "thrust upon it" because of the miscon-
178. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 88-126 and accompanying text.
181. Note, however, that a plaintiff may be able to recover punitive damages under state
law. See, e.g., Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 703 F.2d 1152 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 92 (1983).
182. Application of respondeat superior theory to impose liability on firms for their
employees' securities and commodities violations provides an incentive for firms to supervise
their employees. Some courts interpret § 20(a) of the Exchange Act as imposing a duty of
supervision on securities firms in order to establish the good faith defense of that provision.
See, e.g., Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 438-39 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modi-
fied on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). The SEC can sanction firms if they fail
to reasonably supervise their employees; reasonable supervision is met if the firm has in place
procedures to prevent and detect violations. Exchange Act § 15(b)(4)(E) (1934) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 780 (1982)).
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duct of low-level employees.18 While such expressions of concern
seem to contradict modern respondeat superior theory, they prevail
in the cases discussed above involving employment discrimination"'
and labor relations.1 88 These concerns also find support in RICO's
legislative history, discussed above, with its emphasis on protecting
legitimate business.
E. Compensation v. Penalty
United States v. Ridglea State Bank"' developed the different
considerations in compensatory and penal actions. In the former cat-
egory, the loss distribution and deterrence rationales for respondeat
superior warrant its application, while in the latter category, these
rationales are absent. The issue then becomes whether RICO is pri-
marily a penal or a compensatory statute. The more it resembles a
penal statute, the less appropriate respondeat superior appears to be.
The original and predominant motivation for the statute was to
enable the government to prosecute organized crime more effectively.
RICO was only one article in the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, which was intended to be a comprehensive weapon in the war
against organized crime. 8 7 Indeed, one controversial provision in the
law was the revival of the penalty of criminal forfeiture."8
On the other hand, the Senate Report accompanying the Or-
ganized Crime Control Act of 1970 emphasized that the RICO civil
provisions were remedial and not penal.' This characterization is
supported by the statute's "liberal construction" clause."90 The later
addition of the treble damages provision, it can be argued, does not
affect this classification of the statute. The legislative history repeat-
edly refers to the civil remedies of the antitrust laws, and the treble
damages provision was modeled after that contained in the antitrust
183. See, e.g., Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 24 n.9 (N.D. Ill.
1982).
184. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
186. 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966). See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
187. Courts have characterized RICO as primarily a criminal statute. E.g., Sevill In-
dustrial Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 789 (3d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1179 (1985).
188. Section 1963(c).
189. S. Rep. 91-617 (91st Cong., 1st Sess.) 81-82 (1969). The version of RICO enacted
by the Senate did not contain any private remedies. ". . . there is no intent to visit punishment
on any individual; the purpose is civil. Punishment as such is limited to the criminal reme-
dies ..... Title IX, it must be again emphasized, is remedial rather than penal."
190. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §
904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1971).
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law. The Supreme Court, moreover, in Hydrolevel, rejected the ar-
gument that the antitrust treble damages remedy should be charac-
terized as a penal statute.191
While the Senate Report thus provides the best support for the
position that RICO should be viewed as remedial legislation, it
should be noted that the report solely addressed the civil remedies
available to the government, for the purpose of reforming the cor-
rupted organization.'"' The conflict between this purpose and the
interests of the private plaintiff has already been noted. 9'
Thus, on balance, the loss distribution and deterrence rationales
enunciated in United States v. Ridglea State Bank are inappropriate
considerations in the RICO context; and the statute, in fact, is better
classified as penal for resolution of the respondeat superior issue.
V. CONCLUSION
Part IV has analyzed the specific provisions of RICO in light of
the relevant factors outlined in Part III. While the statutory lan-
guage arguments are inconclusive, they support an argument re-
jecting respondeat superior. Examination of legislative history, while
also not conclusive, provides greater support for rejection. An analy-
sis of the legislative purpose, viewed in the light of Congress's spe-
cific concerns and the general policies of respondeat superior, provide
the strongest arguments for rejection. Finally, sentiments of sympa-
thy for the firm find support in the legislative history, as does the
distinction between compensatory and penal actions.
Therefore, in the typical RICO civil action brought by a de-
frauded customer, alleging churning and suitability violations, the
only appropriate defendant is the registered representative who de-
frauded the customer, and not the securities firm itself. Judicial re-
jection of respondeat superior in these circumstances should reduce
the tremendous number of RICO clams currently naming firms as
defendants and is consistent with RICO's statutory language and un-
derlying purposes. Accordingly, the perception that amendment of
RICO to restrict its application is necessary to reduce the number of
civil RICO claims brought against securities firms and others is
faulty, because judicial recognition of the inapplicability of respon-
deat superior principles would result in dismissal of many of these
claims.
191. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
192. S. Rep. supra note 189, at 81-82.
193. See supra notes 176-78.
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